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Abstract
We introduce a class of reinforcement models where, at each time step t, one first chooses a random subset
At of colours (independent of the past) from n colours of balls, and then chooses a colour i from this subset
with probability proportional to the number of balls of colour i in the urn raised to the power α > 1. We
consider stability of equilibria for such models and establish the existence of phase transitions in a number of
examples, including when the colours are the edges of a graph, a context which is a toy model for the formation
and reinforcement of neural connections.
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1 Introduction
Random processes with reinforcement have been studied mathematically since at least the early 1900s, and
have connections to applied problems such as the design of clinical trials, and the formation of networks such
as neural networks, the Internet, and social networks. One of the most simple and elegant of these models
is known as Po´lya’s urn: starting with one black and one red ball in an urn, select a ball at random from
the urn, replace it, and add another of the same colour. The proportion Xt of black balls in the urn after t
balls have been added is a bounded Martingale, and has a discrete uniform distribution for each t, whence
there is a random variable X ∼ U [0, 1] such that P(Xt → X) = 1. Various generalisations of this model have
been studied in the last hundred years or so, see e.g. [17, 22]. In recent times, reinforced random walks and
preferential attachment models continue to be studied extensively.
One direction of generalisation of Po´lya’s urn is to modify this selection probability (the probability of
selecting a ball of a given colour). Fix W : N→ (0,∞), and if N (i)t is the number of balls of colour i in the urn
at time t, then at time t+ we select a ball of colour i from the urn with probability W (N (i)t )/
∑
jW (N
(j)
t ).
In Po´lya’s urn, there are two colours and W (x) = x. A beautiful construction due to Rubin [8] shows that if∑∞
x=1W (x)
−1 <∞ (sometimes called the strong reinforcement regime) then only one colour is chosen infinitely
often. Otherwise each colour is chosen infinitely often, and if W grows sufficiently slowly (e.g. W (x) = xα for
some α ∈ (0, 1)) then the proportions of each colour are equal in the limit.
A further direction of generalisation involves having multiple interacting urns, where colours may be present
in more than one urn and where multiple balls may be added to one or more urns depending on what colour
is selected. See for example the PhD Thesis (and related papers) of Launay [12, 13, 14], and recent work of
Launay and Limic [15], and Benaim and coauthors [4, 3]. In such settings colours may not be competing with
each other on every iteration of the process, and Rubin’s construction need not apply.
1.1 Our models
Consider the following simplistic model for the reinforcement of neural connections in the brain: A signal
enters the brain at some (randomly) chosen neuron and is transmitted to a (random) single neighbouring
neuron with probability depending on the relative efficiency of the synapses connecting the neurons, and in
doing so the efficiency of the utilized synapse is improved/reinforced. We are interested in the structures and
relative efficiency of neural networks that can arise from repeating this process a very large number of times,
in a strong reinforcement regime.
With this motivation, we consider a large class of “interacting urn”-type models that we have not found
in the literature. Suppose that we have n colours of balls. Let N (i)t be the number of balls of colour i
in our “urn” at time t ∈ Z+, and assume that N (i)0 = 1 for each i ∈ [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The process
~Nt = (N
(i)
t : i ∈ [n]) evolves as follows. At time t ∈ N we choose a subset At ⊂ [n] independently of
Ft−1 = σ{As, (N (i)s : i ∈ [n])}0≤s≤t−1, according to some law. We then select a colour i from the balls of
colours in At according to their current weights in the urn, i.e., given At, we select a ball of colour i ∈ At with
probability
W (N (i)t−1)∑
j∈AtW (N
(j)
t−1)
(1)
then we replace that ball and add another of the same colour, so that N (j)t = N
(j)
t−1 + 1{j=i}. For a fixed n,
the law of such a model is then completely specified by the function W and the law of A1, so we will refer to
any such model as a (W,A)-Reinforcement Model, or simply a WARM.
In [10] we consider the case W (x) = eγx for some fixed γ > 0. In this paper our results will be for
reinforcement functions W : N→ (0,∞) of the following kind:
Condition (α): W (x) = xα for some fixed α > 1.
We will also assume the following condition.
Condition 1.1 (Subset selection). The subsets (At)t≥0 are i.i.d. with p∅ = 0, where pA ≡ P(At = A).
We are interested in the random vectors ~Xt = ~Nt/(t+ n) of proportions of balls of each colour, and more
precisely their limits as t → ∞. Any model with p∅ ∈ (0, 1) can be considered as a random time change of
a model with p∅ = 0, which does not affect the possible limits of ~Xt. Thus we lose nothing in assuming that
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p∅ = 0 in Condition 1.1. For models with plenty of symmetry in terms of the colour labellings, we may instead
consider the ordered vector [ ~Xt], having the same elements as ~Xt, but listed in decreasing order. Most of our
examples satisfy the following symmetry property, which implies that P(|A1| = m) = nm−1ampm:
Condition 1.2 (Symmetry). There exist (p`)
n
`=1 and (a`)
n
`=1 such that for every m ≥ 0,
(i) pA ∈ {0, pm} whenever |A| = m, and
(ii) #{A 3 i : |A| = m, pA = pm} = am for every i ∈ [n].
Condition 1.2 is somewhat unpalatable, so let us point out that many of the models considered in this
paper satisfy the following stronger symmetry property, which implies that P(|A1| = m) =
(
n
m
)
pm, and
also that (almost surely) at least n − m + 1 colours are chosen a positive proportion of the time, where
m = min{m ≥ 1 : pm > 0}.
Condition 1.3 (Strong symmetry). There exist (pi)
n
i=1 such that pA = pm whenever |A| = m.
We are primarily interested in the setting where the colours [n] are the edges (synapses) of a connected
graph G (brain) with nv vertices (neurons). In this setting we will assume the following.
Condition 1.4. Vt is chosen uniformly at random from the vertices of G, and At is the set of edges incident
to Vt.
WARMs where the law of A1 corresponds to Condition 1.4 on some graph G will be called WARM graphs.
When G is specified the WARM will be called a WARM (on) G.
1.2 Examples
We begin with two WARMs that are in general not WARM graphs.
Example 1.5 (Uniform, fixed m). Fix m ∈ [n] (the model becomes relatively trivial when m = 1 or m = n)
and choose At with |At| = m uniformly at random from [n]. Then |At| = m almost surely and P(At = A) =
m!(n −m)!/n! when |A| = m. This is the special case of Condition 1.3 with pr = 0 for all r 6= m. At least
n−m+ 1 colours are each chosen a positive proportion of the time.
Example 1.6 (Bernoulli(p)). Fix p ∈ (0, 1), and independently choose each colour to be in At with probability
p. After a parameter change (due to p∅ = (1 − p)n > 0), this is the special case of Condition 1.3 with
pm = p
m(1− p)n−m(1− p∅)−1 for all m ≥ 1. All n colours are chosen a positive proportion of the time.
A natural extension of Example 1.6 would be to have a different p for each colour. Turning to WARM
graphs (i.e., assuming Condition 1.4 hereafter), observe that the special case of Example 1.6 with n = 2 and
p = 1/2 is the same as the WARM on the star-graph on 2 edges.
Example 1.7 (WARM Star graph). Let G be the star-graph on nv = n + 1 vertices consisting of a central
vertex connected by n edges to n leaves (vertices of degree 1). Then the WARM on G is the special case of
Condition 1.3 with p1 = pn = 1/(n+ 1) and pm = 0 otherwise.
In the next two examples, G is regular with degree d = d(n) (so |At| = d almost surely), so the WARM
on G satisfies Condition 1.2 with pA = 0 if |A| 6= d, and with pd = 1/nv and ad = 2 since any one of the
nv vertices is equally likely to be Vt and every edge is incident to 2 vertices. On the other hand there exist
subsets of size d that are chosen with probability 0 (so Condition 1.3 is not satisfied).
Example 1.8 (WARM Cycle graph). Let G be the cycle graph with n edges and n vertices. Each vertex is of
degree d = 2.
Example 1.9 (WARM Complete graph). Let G be the complete graph on nv vertices, with n = nv(nv − 1)/2
edges. Each vertex is of degree d = nv − 1.
Note that Examples 1.9, 1.8, and 1.5 (with m = 2) are all identical when n = 3, and correspond to
the WARM triangle graph which is studied extensively in Section 3.3. All of the above examples satisfy the
symmetry property Condition 1.2. Let us now give a simple example that does not satisfy Condition 1.2(ii).
Example 1.10 (WARM Line/Path graph). Let G be the line segment with n edges (and n+ 1 vertices). The
two leaves have degree 1, while all interior vertices have degree 2.
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Star graphs and the line graph with n = 3 are special cases of whisker graphs (which also fails to satisfy
Condition 1.2 in general) defined as follows.
Example 1.11 (WARM Whisker graph). A whisker graph is defined as a tree with a diameter less than or
equal to three. If the diameter is equal to two, then we obtain a star graph. If the diameter is equal to three,
then we have a graph consisting of a distinguished edge e with r ≥ 1 leaves incident to one endvertex of e and
s = n− (r+ 1) ≥ 1 leaves incident to the other endvertex (i.e. G is constructed by connecting two star graphs
by a single edge, e).
We believe that whisker graphs play a central role in the graph setting (see Conjecture 1.24).
1.3 Linearly stable equilibria
For fixed n and ~v ∈ ∆n ≡ {~u ∈ Rn : ui ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 ui = 1}, let F : ∆n → Rn be defined (for a given WARM)
by
F (~v)i = −vi + lim
t→∞
∑
A3i
pA
W (vit)∑
j∈AW (vjt)
. (2)
Definition 1.12 (Equilibrium). For fixed n, a vector ~v ∈ ∆n is an equilibrium distribution for the WARM
if F (~v) = ~0. We let E denote the set of equilibria for a given WARM, and write Eα = E when Condition (α)
holds.
Intuitively this says that in the limit as t → ∞, the proportion of balls of colour i in the urn is equal to
the probability that the next selected ball is of colour i. To see that the term inside the limit in (2) sums to
1, observe that
n∑
i=1
∑
A3i
pA
W (vit)∑
j∈AW (vjt)
=
∑
A6=∅
∑
i∈A
pA
W (vit)∑
j∈AW (vjt)
=
∑
A 6=∅
pA = 1.
Note that when W (x) = xα, F (~v) = ~0 reduces to
vi =
∑
A3i
pA · v
α
i∑
j∈A v
α
j
. (3)
Let the partial derivatives of F at ~v be denoted by Di,k = ∂F (~v)i/∂vk, whenever these quantities exist,
and let D(~v) denote the matrix with (i, k) entry Di,k evaluated at the point ~v.
Definition 1.13 (Stable equilibrium). An equilibrium distribution ~v (i.e. satisfying (3)) is a linearly-stable
equilibrium if all eigenvalues of D(~v) have negative real parts, linearly-unstable equilibrium if some eigenvalue
of D(~v) has positive real part, and critical otherwise. Let S denote the set of linearly-stable equilibria for a
given WARM, and write Sα = S when Condition (α) holds.
For a given WARM, let A(=Aα when Condition (α) holds) denote the (random, nonempty) set of accumu-
lation points of the sequence ~Xt. The main reason that we are interested in linearly-stable equilibria is because
of the following theorem (and conjecture) whose proof (see Appendix A) relies on Theorem 1.16 below together
with the general theory of the dynamical system approach to studying stochastic approximation algorithms,
established by Bena¨ım and coauthors. See for example [4, Proposition 3.5, Theorem 3.9, Theorem 3.11].
Theorem 1.14 (Accumulation structure). Assume Conditions (α) and 1.1. Then
(i) almost surely Aα ⊂ Eα and Aα is a connected subset of ∆n,
(ii) P( ~Xt → ~v) > 0 for every ~v ∈ Sα.
It follows from Theorem 1.14(i) that if |Eα| < ∞ then (|Aα| = 1 almost surely so) ~Xt converges almost
surely. Moreover, if |Eα| = 1 then ~Xt converges almost surely to this unique equilibrium. We shall see that
when n = 2 and α = 3 in Example 1.7 there is a unique equilibrium (Eα = {(1/2, 1/2)}, whence ~Xt almost
surely converges to (1/2, 1/2)) that is not linearly stable (Sα = ∅).
Conjecture 1.15 (Convergence to equlibirum). For any WARM with α > 1, there exists a random vector
~X = (X1, . . . , Xn), supported on the set of linearly-stable and critical equilibria such that P( ~Xt → ~X) = 1.
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1.4 Main results
Our main results describe the set Sα of linearly-stable equilibria in various situations, and hence (assuming
Conjecture 1.15) the possible limiting proportions of balls of each colour. In particular we are interested in
phase transitions in the set Sα (including whether each colour can be chosen equally often) as α > 1 varies.
Our first main result states that the number of linearly-stable equilibria is finite under Conditions (α) and 1.1.
Theorem 1.16 (Finite number of stable equilibria). Assume Conditions (α) and 1.1. Then Sα is finite.
We will see some examples where Sα = ∅, but in many cases the existence of at least one linearly-stable
equilibrium is given by the following results, when α > 1 is sufficiently small.
Lemma 1.17 (~1/n equilibrium). Assume Conditions 1.1 and 1.2. Then ~1/n ∈ Eα.
Note that ~1/n is not an equilibrium for Example 1.10, which does not satisfy Condition 1.2. The eigenvalues
associated to ~1/n ∈ Eα will be continuous functions of α, giving rise to the transitions between the linear-stable
and critical regions:
Proposition 1.18 (Stability of ~1/n). Assume Conditions 1.1, 1.3, (α), and that pn < 1. Then ~1/n ∈ Sα if
and only if
α <
1
n2
∑n
m=2
pm
m2
(
n−2
m−2
) . (4)
Moreover, ~1/n is critical if and only if equality holds in (4).
Here the right hand side is strictly larger than 1 when pn < 1, so under the assumptions of Proposition
1.18, ~1/n ∈ Sα for α > 1 but sufficiently close (depending on the model) to 1, and ~1/n /∈ Sα for α sufficiently
large. In other words, all such models exhibit at least one phase transition. By applying Proposition 1.18 to
various special cases one obtains the following:
Corollary 1.19 (Stability of ~1/n in Examples 1.5–1.7). The equilibrium ~1/n is linearly-stable (critical when
equality holds below) for:
Example 1.5 if and only if
α <
m(n− 1)
n(m− 1) ;
Example 1.6 if and only if
α <
1− (1− p)n∑n
m=2 p
m(1− p)n−m n2m2
(
n−2
m−2
) ;
Example 1.7 if and only if α < n+ 1.
The remaining examples have rather different behaviour:
Proposition 1.20 (Stability of ~1/n in Examples 1.8–1.9). The equilibrium ~1/n is linearly-stable (critical when
equality holds below) for:
Example 1.8 if and only if n is odd and α < cos
(
pi
2n
)−2
;
Example 1.9 if and only if n = 3 and α < 4/3.
Note that in the graph setting, when ~v = ~1/n, the matrix of partial derivatives is related to the edge-
adjacency matrix. Typically ~1/n is not the only equilibrium, and indeed we will see many more examples
of linearly-stable equilibria for various models. See for example Corollary 3.1 in the case of Example 1.5.
If Condition 1.4 (and Condition 1.1) is satisfied then by the law of large numbers, any ~v ∈ E must satisfy
vi ≤ 2/nv for each edge i, since each edge is incident to 2 vertices. Similarly, for any i incident to a leaf we
have vi ≥ 1/nv.
The following result often allows one to find stable equilibria in large systems by finding stable equilibria
in smaller systems.
Lemma 1.21 (Stability reduction). Suppose that pA = P(At = A) for each A ⊂ [n], with p{n} = 0, and define
p′A\{n} = pA. Then ~v = (v1, . . . , vn−1, 0) is a (linearly-stable) equilibrium for the WARM (pA)A⊂[n] if and only
if ~v′ = (v1, . . . , vn−1) is a (linearly-stable) equilibrium for the WARM (p′A′)A′⊂Cn−1 .
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The most important consequence of Lemma 1.21 for us is in the graph setting. Let G be a graph with vertex
set V and edge set E, and let nv = |V |. Let G1, . . . , Gk be connected subgraphs of G with Ej = {e1, . . . , e|Ej |}
and Vj denoting the edge set and vertex set respectively of Gj . Let
GG =
{
G = {Gj}kj=1 : k ≤ nv/2, |Vj | ≥ 2 for each j, V = ∪kj=1Vj , Vj ∩ Vj′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′
}
, (5)
denote the V -spanning collections of non-trivial connected clusters of G, and let E = ∪kj=1Ej . Let EG and SG
denote the equilibria and linearly stable equilibria for a WARM on G.
Theorem 1.22 (Subgraph stability reduction). Fix G, and let
G = {Gj}kj=1 ∈ GG and ~v =
(
(ve)e∈E1 , (ve)e∈E2 , . . . , (ve)e∈Ek , (0)e∈E\E
)
.
Then, for any WARM on G,
(1) ~v ∈ EG if and only if |V ||Vj | (ve)e∈Ej ∈ EGj for each j = 1, . . . , k,
(2) ~v ∈ SG if and only if |V ||Vj | (ve)e∈Ej ∈ SGj for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Definition 1.23 ((G,α)-stable allocation). Given a graph G, α > 1 and G ∈ GG, we say that G admits a
(G,α)-stable allocation if there exists ~v with ve′ > 0 for all e
′ ∈ E and ve = 0 for all e ∈ E \ E such that
~v ∈ (Sα)G or ~v is critical.
An element G of GG is said to be a whisker-forest (resp. star-forest) if each component Gj is a whisker
(resp. star) graph.
Conjecture 1.24 (Whisker-forest conjecture). Let G be any graph. There exists αG such that, for all α > αG,
(i) any whisker-forest G on G admits a (G,α)-stable allocation;
(ii) for any ~v ∈ (Sα)G, there exists a whisker-forest G on G such that: ve > 0 if and only if e ∈ E.
As in Conjecture 1.24(ii), we believe that when α is large enough (depending on G), all stable equilibria
live on whisker forests. What we have proved in this direction is the following result, which follows from an
explicit characterisation (see Theorem 3.3) of Sα for the WARM star graph:
Theorem 1.25 ((G,α)-stable allocation for star-forests). For any graph G, and α > 1, any star-forest G on
G admits a (G,α)-stable allocation.
For large α, this result can be extended to symmetric-whisker-forests, where each non-star component is
symmetric (i.e. s = r) due to the following result:
Theorem 1.26 (Symmetric whisker graphs). For every symmetric (s = r) whisker graph G, there exists
αG > 1 such that for all α > αG, (Sα)G is non-empty. Consequently, any symmetric whisker-forest G on G
admits a (G,α)-stable allocation, if α is sufficiently large (depending on G).
1.5 Overview of the paper
In Section 2 we prove Theorem 1.16, Lemma 1.17, Proposition 1.18, and Theorem 1.22. In Section 3 we obtain
more detailed results on the existence of linearly-stable equilibria for various examples. In Section 4 we discuss
some open problems, in particular some related to Conjecture 1.24. The proof of Theorem 1.14 follows the
standard approach and is relegated to Appendix A.
2 Proofs of general results
In this section we prove the general results of Section 1.4, assuming Conditions 1.1 and (α) throughout. We
opt for a proof of Theorem 1.22 instead of proving Lemma 1.21. We therefore begin this section with the proof
that there are only finitely many stable equilibria.
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2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.16
Fix α > 1. For n = 1, the claim is trivial. The proof proceeds via induction over n, assuming that the result
holds for all n′ < n.
Let ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Eα denote an equilibrium distribution, so that
F (~v) = ~0, (6)
where
Fi(~v) = −vi +
∑
A3i
pA
vαi∑
k∈A v
α
k
, for i ∈ [n]. (7)
We assume vi 6= 0 for all i ∈ [n]. If an equilibrium is linearly stable for the system of n equations and there is
some I 6= ∅ such that vi = 0 for all i ∈ I, then it is linearly stable for the system on [n] \ I (see Lemma 1.21
or [4, Corollary 3.8]).
Let A ⊂ [n] be non-empty. Since α > 1, using Ho¨lder’s inequality we have
∑
k∈A
vαk ≥
(∑
k∈A
vk
)α
|A|1−α. (8)
By the law of large numbers, the set A is chosen a proportion pA of the time (in the limit as t → ∞). It
follows that colours contained in A are chosen at least pA proportion of the time, hence∑
k∈A
vk ≥ pA. (9)
Equations (8) and (9) yield ∑
k∈A
vαk ≥ pαA|A|1−α. (10)
Inserting this into (6) we obtain
v1−αi =
∑
A3i
pA
1∑
k∈A v
α
k
≤
∑
A3i
pAp
−α
A |A|α−1.
Thus,
vi ≥
(∑
A3i
(pA/|A|)1−α
)1/(1−α)
.
This shows that there exists a (model dependent) ε > 0 such that there is no ~v ∈ Eα satisfying 0 < vi < ε for
some i ∈ [n]. It remains to prove that for any ε > 0 there are only finitely many ~v ∈ Sα satisfying vi ≥ ε for
all i ∈ [n].
Fix ε > 0, and choose δ ∈ (0, pi2α ) and define Hn ⊂ Cn to be the Cartesian product of n copies of the open
complex domain
H :=
{
z ∈ C : ε
2
< |z| < 2, | arg(z)| < δ
}
.
Since, for z ∈ H,
| arg(zα)| = α| arg(z)| < αδ < pi/2,
we see that Re(zα) > 0 for all z ∈ H. Therefore for non-empty A, Re[∑k∈A vαk ] > 0 for ~v ∈ Hn, in particular,
all functions ~v 7→ ∑
k∈A
vαk are analytic and zero-free in H
n, which shows that the functions
~v 7→ v
α
i∑
k∈A
vαk
are also analytic in Hn, so finally we conclude that the functions Fi(~v) are analytic in H
n.
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Next, define the map F : Hn 7→ Cn by F (~v) = (F1(~v), F2(~v), . . . , Fn(~v)) and the set
H := {~v ∈ Hn : F (~v) = ~0 and det [D(~v)] 6= 0}.
Clearly Sα ⊂ H. Our goal is to show that (i) H is a set of isolated points and (ii) it does not have accumulation
points in the interior of the domain Hn.
To prove (i), let ~w ∈ H. Since F (~w) = ~0 and det [D(~w)] 6= 0, due to the Implicit Function Theorem (see [24,
Theorem 2, page 40]) there exists a biholomorphic map between some neighborhoods U 3 ~w and V 3 ~0 (that
is, a bijective holomorphic function whose inverse is also holomorphic). Since the map is bijective, there are
no other solutions to the system Fi(~v) = 0, i ∈ [n] in U , which shows that each element of H must be an
isolated point.
To prove (ii), let us assume the converse, i.e., there exists a point ~w ∈ Hn which is an accumulation point
of H. Define
Z := {~v ∈ Hn : F (~v) = ~0},
so Z is an analytic set in the sense of [24, Definition 1, page 129], and clearly H ⊆ Z. According to [23,
Theorem 2.2, page 52], there exists a neighborhood ∆ ⊂ Hn of the point ~w, such that the analytic set ∆ ∩ Z
can be decomposed into a finite number of pure-dimensional analytic sets. Pure-dimensional means that the
set has the same dimension at each point. One of these pure-dimensional analytic sets must have dimension
zero (since we have assumed that ~w is an accumulation point for isolated points in H, and isolated points are
zero-dimensional). It is also clear that this zero-dimensional analytic set must have an accumulation point at
~w. Now we use [24, Theorem 6 on page 135], which says that this is impossible: any zero-dimensional analytic
set in ∆ cannot have limit points inside ∆. Therefore, we have arrived at a contradiction.
So far we have proved that the set H consists of isolated points and does not have accumulation points in
the interior of Hn. Since the set
B := {~v ∈ Cn : Im(vi) = 0, ε ≤ Re(vi) ≤ 1}
is compact in Cn, we conclude that the set B ∩Hn is finite. Since stable equilibria are elements of B ∩Hn,
this shows that we can have only finitely many ~v ∈ Sα satisfying vi > ε for each i. 
2.2 Proof of Lemma 1.17 and Proposition 1.18
Proof of Lemma 1.17. Assume that Condition 1.2 holds. Then, for ~v = ~1/n, the right hand side of (3) becomes
∑
A3i
pA
|A| =
n∑
m=1
∑
A3i:
|A|=m
pA
m
=
n∑
m=1
ampm
m
, (11)
which does not depend on i ∈ [n]. Since these quantities sum to 1, it follows that the right hand side of (3) is
equal to 1/n for each i, which proves that ~1/n is an equilibrium (i.e., Lemma 1.17). 
Recall that the adjugate matrix adjA of a square matrix A is given by adjA = CT, i.e., the transpose of
the cofactor matrix C of A. Recall that if A is a diagonal matrix with entries Aii, then its cofactor matrix
is a diagonal matrix C with Cii =
∏
j 6=iAjj , and its adjugate matrix is a diagonal matrix adjA = C
T = C.
In order to prove Proposition 1.18, we will use the following modification of the Matrix Determinant Lemma,
which we have not found in the literature (although we expect that it is well known).
Lemma 2.1 (Modified Matrix Determinant Lemma). If R ∈ Rn×n and ~y, ~w ∈ Rn are column vectors then
det(R + ~y ~wT) = det(R) + ~wTadj(R)~y. (12)
Proof. If R is invertible, then the matrix determinant lemma gives
det(R + ~y ~wT) = (1 + ~wTR−1~y) det(R) = det(R) + ~wTR−1 det(R)~y = det(R) + ~wTadj(R)~y.
If R is not invertible then R has some eigenvalues that are zero (and possibly some non-zero) and there exists
some ε0 (corresponding to the smallest magnitude-non-zero eigenvalue) such that no ε ∈ (0, ε0) is an eigenvalue
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for R, i.e., det(R− εI) 6= 0 for all such ε. Therefore, R− εI is invertible for any such ε. It follows that for all
ε ∈ (0, ε0)
det(R− εI + ~y ~wT) = det(R− εI) + ~wTadj(R− εI)~y. (13)
We obtain the desired conclusion by taking the limit as ε ↓ 0 on both sides of (13), and using the facts that
all entries of adj(R) are just sums and differences of minors (determinants of submatrices), and determinants
are continuous functions of R (in the natural sense). 
Proof of Proposition 1.18. When W (x) = xα, (2) becomes
F (~v)i = −vi +
∑
A3i
pA
vαi∑
j∈A v
α
j
,
so that
Di,i(~v) = −1 + αvα−1i
∑
A3i
pA
∑
j∈A v
α
j − vαi(∑
j∈A v
α
j
)2 , (14)
and, for k 6= i,
Di,k(~v) = −αvα−1k vαi
∑
A3i,k
pA
1(∑
j∈A v
α
j
)2 . (15)
When ~v = ~1/n, this reduces to
Di,i(~1/n) =− 1 + αn
∑
A3i
pA
|A| − 1
|A|2 , (16)
Di,k(~1/n) =− αn
∑
A3i,k
pA
1
|A|2 . (17)
Assume that Condition 1.3 holds. Then, (16) can be written as
Di,i(~1/n) =− 1 + αn
n∑
m=1
pm
∑
A:|A|=m,i∈A
m− 1
m2
=− 1 + αn
n∑
m=2
pm
m2
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
(m− 1)
≡− 1 + β, (18)
Di,k(~1/n) =− αn
n∑
m=2
pm
m2
(
n− 2
m− 2
)
, for k 6= i
≡δ < 0.
To compute the eigenvalues of D(~1/n), observe that
H ≡ D− λI = (−(1 + λ) + β − δ)I +~1(δ~1)T.
Hence, by Lemma 2.1, the determinant of H is
(−(1 + λ) + β − δ)n +
n∑
i=1
δ(−(1 + λ) + β − δ)n−1.
This is equal to zero when
λ = β − δ − 1, or λ = (n− 1)δ + β − 1 = −1.
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The first eigenvalue satisfies
λ =αn
n∑
m=2
pm
m2
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
(m− 1) + αn
n∑
m=2
pm
m2
(
n− 2
m− 2
)
− 1
=αn2
n∑
m=2
pm
m2
(
n− 2
m− 2
)
− 1,
which is continuous and increasing in α, and is < 0 if and only if
α <
1
n2
∑n
m=2
pm
m2
(
n−2
m−2
) ,
as required. 
2.3 Proof of Theorem 1.22
Under Condition 1.4, pA = 1/|V | for every A that is the set of edges incident to some vertex, and of course
every edge e is an edge in exactly two such A. For a vertex x and an edge e write x ∈ e if e = (x, x′) = (x′, x)
for some x′ ∈ V (i.e. if x is an endvertex of e). Then the equilibrium equation for e /∈ E is 0 = 0, while for
e ∈ Ej it is
ve =
∑
A3e
pA
vαe∑
e′∈A v
α
e′
=
∑
x∈V :
x∈e
1
|V |
vαe∑
e′∈E:
x∈e′
vαe′
(19)
=
∑
x∈Vj :
x∈e
1
|V |
vαe∑
e′∈Ej :
x∈e′
vαe′ +
∑
e′ /∈Ej :
x∈e′
vαe′
, (20)
where Let e′ /∈ Ej but x ∈ e′ and x ∈ Vj . Then we have by definition of G that x /∈ Vi for i 6= j, so e′ /∈ Ei
for any i. This means that ve′ = 0. It follows that the second sum in the denominator of (20) vanishes, so
ve =
∑
x∈Vj :
x∈e
1
|V |
vαe∑
e′∈Ej :
x∈e′
vαe′
, and therefore
|V |
|Vj |ve =
∑
x∈Vj :
x∈e
1
|Vj |
( |V ||Vj |ve)
α∑
e′∈Ej :
x∈e′
( |V ||Vj |ve′)
α
, (21)
which is (19) for the graph Gj 3 e and appropriately rescaled v components. This proves the first claim.
For the second claim, note that if e ∈ Ej and e′ /∈ Ej then for ~v as in the theorem F (~v)e does not depend
on v′e. Thus for such e, e
′ we have De,e′ = 0. It follows that D(~v) is a block diagonal matrix of the form
D =

D(1) 0 · · · 0
0 D(2) · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · D(k+1)
 ,
where D(i) is the D matrix for Gi for i ≤ k and where D(k+1) = −I|E\E|, and Im denotes the identity matrix
of dimension m. Thus the eigenvalues of D are simply those of each D(i), i ∈ [k + 1] combined. Since the
eigenvalue of D(k+1) is −1 < 0, the result follows. 
3 Special cases
In this section, we examine some of our examples more carefully, beginning with one of the non-graphical
WARMs.
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3.1 Fixed m, uniform At model
Recall that for this model, defined in Example 1.5, at least n−m+ 1 colours must be each chosen a positive
proportion of the time. It is not too hard to prove that with positive probability m − 1 of the colours are
never chosen, from which it follows that with positive probability exactly n−m+ 1 colours are each chosen a
positive proportion of the time.
From (3) ~v is an equilibrium if and only if
vi =
(
n
m
)−1 ∑
A3i:
|A|=m
vαi∑
j∈A v
α
j
. (22)
The first claim of Corollary 1.19 follows directly from Proposition 1.18 with pm =
(
n
m
)−1
for each of the
(
n
m
)
subsets of size m. The following extension of this result could be obtained from Lemmas 1.21 and 1.17, and
Proposition 1.18, by keeping track of the p′s for various values of s after n − k colours have been removed.
However, a direct proof is also not too hard, as we will see in the following.
Here and elsewhere, we use the notation (u)k to denote the vector (u, . . . , u) ∈ Rk.
Corollary 3.1 (Stability in the fixedm, uniform At model). Let k ≥ n−m+1. Then ~v = ((1/k)k, (0)n−k) ∈ Eα
for all α, and ~v ∈ Sα if and only if
α <
(
n
m
)
k2
(n−k)∧(m−2)∑
r=(m−k)∨0
(
n− k
r
)
1
(m− r)2
(
k − 2
m− r − 2
) ,
while ~v is critical if equality holds.
Proof. With ~v of the given form we have that (14)-(15) reduces to Di,i = −1 and Di,` = D`,i = 0 for i > k. For
i ≤ k, using the fact that n−k ≤ m−1, and that m−r−1 = 0 if r = m−1 we have with s′ = (n−k)∧(m−2),
Di,i =− 1 +
(
n
m
)−1
αk
s′∑
r=s
(
k − 1
m− r − 1
)(
n− k
r
)
m− r − 1
(m− r)2 ,
Di,` =−
(
n
m
)−1
αk
s′∑
r=s
(
k − 2
m− r − 2
)(
n− k
r
)
1
(m− r)2 .
Using Lemma 2.1,
det(D− λI) = (−(1 + λ))n−k)(ak + bak−1k) = (−(1 + λ))n−kak−1(a+ bk),
with
b =−
(
n
m
)−1
αk
s′∑
r=s
(
k − 2
m− r − 2
)(
n− k
r
)
1
(m− r)2
a =− (1 + λ) +
(
n
m
)−1
αk
s′∑
r=s
(
k − 1
m− r − 1
)(
n− k
r
)
m− r − 1
(m− r)2 − b
=− (1 + λ) +
(
n
m
)−1
αk2
s′∑
r=s
(
n− k
r
)
1
(m− r)2
(
k − 2
m− r − 2
)
.
The term a+ bk can be computed explicitly and equals −(1 + λ), i.e., λ = −1.
Note that k − 1 ≥ 1 since m < n, so it remains to consider the case a = 0, i.e.,
λ = −1 +
(
n
m
)−1
αk2
s′∑
r=s
(
n− k
r
)
1
(m− r)2
(
k − 2
m− r − 2
)
,
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which is continuous and increasing in α and is negative if and only if
α <
(
n
m
)
k2
∑s′
r=s
(
n−k
r
)
1
(m−r)2
(
k−2
m−r−2
) .

3.2 Star graph
Throughout this section, we consider a WARM star graph on n edges. First we describe the situation where
n = 2 (which is the same as the simplest line graph, and which also corresponds (after a time-change) to
Example 1.6 with n = 2 and p = 1/2).
Theorem 3.2 (Equilibria and stability for star graph with two edges). For the star graph with two edges the
following is true: For α = 3, Eα = {(1/2, 1/2)} and this equilibrium is critical, while for every α 6= 3 there
exists a unique (v, u) ∈ Sα, where v = v(α) ≥ 1/2. Moreover, v(α) is a continuous function of α, that is
strictly increasing for α > 3 from v(3) = 1/2 to v(+∞) = 2/3, and such that v(α) = 1/2 for α < 3.
The main result of this section is the following, which will be proved via a sequence of lemmas:
Theorem 3.3 (Equilibria and stability for star graphs). There exist α˜(k, n) ∈ (1, n + 1) (for k ∈ [n]) such
that the only equilibria for the star graph with n ≥ 2 edges are given by
(i) (1/n)n for α > 1; and (with v > u)
(ii) ((v)k, (u)n−k) for 1 ≤ k < n/2 and α > α˜(k, n), with v(α) increasing in α;
(iii) ((v)k, (u)n−k) for 1 ≤ k < n/2 and α ∈ (α˜(k, n), n+ 1), with v(α) decreasing in α;
(iv) ((v)k, (u)n−k) for n/2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and α > n+ 1, with v(α) increasing in α.
Moreover, (1/n)n ∈ Sα if and only if α < n + 1 (it is critical when α = n + 1). Equilibrium (ii) ∈ Sα if and
only if k = 1 and α > α˜(1, n) (in which case v(+∞) = 2/(n+ 1)). All other equilibria are not linearly stable.
Recall that for the star graph on n edges, any equilibrium ~v ∈ Eα must satisfy
vi =
1
n+ 1
+
1
n+ 1
· v
α
i
vα1 + · · ·+ vαn
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (23)
Then, clearly ~v ∈ Eα must satisfy 1/(n+ 1) < vi < 2/(n+ 1) for each edge i ∈ [n], therefore all equilibria are
internal, and vi/vj ∈ [1/2, 2].
Lemma 3.4. Assume that ~v ∈ Eα for the WARM star graph with n edges. Then ~v = (1/n)n or there exist
v > u and k ∈ [n− 1] such that ~v = ((v)k, (u)n−k).
Proof. Assume that ~v is an equilibrium. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the set of ~v such that ∑ni=1 vαi = δ. Define
a function f : (0, 1) 7→ R by
f(x) = x−1(1 + δ−1xα). (24)
Then (23) is equivalent to f(vi) = n+ 1. Since
f ′(x) = −x−2 + (α− 1)δ−1xα−2 = x−2((α− 1)δ−1xα − 1),
the function f has an extremum where xα = δ/(α− 1). Hence, when
δ ∈ α− 1
(n+ 1)α
(1, 2α),
there is exactly one local extremum in (1, 2)/(n+1), and otherwise there are no local extrema in (1, 2)/(n+1).
It follows that for any δ, there are at most two solutions to f(x) = n + 1, whence any equilibrium ~v has at
most 2 distinct components. 
Lemma 3.5. There exist unique equilibria satisfying (ii)-(iv) of Theorem 3.3.
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Figure 1: Solving equation αt = fk,n(t) when k < n/2. The black curve is y = fk,n(t). The blue
line is y = α˜t where α˜ = α(k, n) and the red line is y = (n+ 1)t.
Proof. Assume that 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Any ~v ∈ Eα if and only if it satisfies (23). For ~v of the form ~v =
((v)k, (u)n−k), (23) is equivalent to a single equation
u =
1
n+ 1
+
1
n+ 1
· u
α
kvα + (n− k)uα , (25)
plus the balance equation kv + (n− k)u = 1. We introduce a new variable
t = ln(v/u) = ln
(
1
k
(
1
u
− n+ k
))
.
From the above formula it follows that
u =
1
n+ k(et − 1) ,
and (25) gives us
1
n+ k(et − 1) =
1
n+ 1
+
1
n+ 1
· 1
n− k + keαt . (26)
Solving the above equation for eαt we obtain
eαt =
n+ 1− k
k
· e
t − n−kn−k+1
1+k
k − et
. (27)
Let us define a := (n− k)/(n− k + 1), b := (1 + k)/k and
fk,n(t) := ln
(
n+ 1− k
k
· e
t − a
b− et
)
, ln(a) < t < ln(b), 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. (28)
Then, (27) is equivalent to
αt = fk,n(t). (29)
Let us investigate the function t 7→ fk,n(t) in more detail. We compute
f ′k,n(t) =
a
et − a +
b
b− et ,
f ′′k,n(t) =
[
− a
(et − a)2 +
b
(b− et)2
]
et =
(b− a)et(e2t − ab)
(et − a)2(b− et)2 .
From these equations, we obtain the following facts:
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Figure 2: Solving equation αt = fk,n(t) when k ≥ n/2. The black curve is y = fk,n(t). The red
line is y = (n+ 1)t.
(i) fk,n(t) is an increasing function and fk,n(t)→ +∞ as t ↑ ln(b);
(ii) fk,n(0) = 0 and f
′
k,n(0) = n+ 1;
(iii) fk,n(t) is concave for t ∈ (ln(a), t˜) and convex for t ∈ (t˜, ln(b)), where t˜ := ln(ab)/2;
(iv) f ′′k,n(0) = (2k − n)(n+ 1);
(v) The inflection point t˜ satisfies t˜ ≤ 0 if k ≥ n/2 and t˜ > 0 if k < n/2.
(vi) For all t ∈ (ln(a), ln(b)) we have f ′k,n(t) ≥ f ′k,n(t˜) =
√
b+
√
a√
b−√a > 1.
Let us first consider the case when k < n/2. Then the function t 7→ fk,n(t) is concave on (0, t˜) and convex
on (t˜, ln(b)). The graph of fk,n(t) is shown in Figure 1. Note that there exists a unique α˜(n, k) such that
the straight line y = α˜t is tangent to y = fk,n(t) at some point t˜ (see the blue line in Figure 1). Since
fk,n(0) = n + 1 and fk,n(t) is an increasing function, we see that α˜ < n + 1, and item (vi) above shows that
α˜ > 1. It is clear that: for α > α˜ there is a solution t2(α) to (29) that is an increasing function of α; for
α ∈ (α˜, n+ 1) there is another solution t1(α) < t˜ < t2(α) that is decreasing in α; there are no other solutions
to (29). This demonstrates both the existence and uniqueness of equilibria satisfying (ii) and (iii) of Theorem
3.3 respectively.
When k ≥ n/2 the situation is simpler, as the function t 7→ fk,n(t) is convex on (0, ln(b)). Since f ′k,n(0) =
n+ 1 we see that for every α > n+ 1 there exists a unique positive solution to (29), and that this solution is
increasing in α. See Figure 2. Finally, note that when k = 1, t ↑ log(b) as α ↑ ∞ implies that v(n−1)/(1−v) ↑
b = 2 which in turn implies that v ↑ 2/(n+ 1). 
For ~v ∈ Rn and a > 0, write ~va = (va1 , . . . , van), so that e.g. ((v)k, (u)n−k)a = ((va)k, (ua)n−k).
Lemma 3.6. Assume ~v = ((v)k, (u)n−k) ∈ Eα for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and v > u. Let η = kvα + (n − k)uα
and ξ = α(n+ 1)−1η−2. Then ~v ∈ Sα (critical if equality holds below) if and only if
k = 1 and ξ(uv)α−1 < 1, or
k ≥ 2 and v < α
(α− 1)(n+ 1) .
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Proof. The matrix D of partial derivatives has entries
Dii =− 1 + ξ ×
{
vα−1 ((k − 1)vα + (n− k)uα) if i ≤ k,
uα−1 (kvα + (n− k − 1)uα) if i > k,
=− 1 + ξ ×
{
vα−1η − v2α−1 if i ≤ k,
uα−1η − u2α−1 if i > k,
Dij =− ξ ×

v2α−1 if i, j ≤ k,
vαuα−1 if i ≤ k < j,
vα−1uα if j ≤ k < i,
u2α−1 if i, j > k.
Let
~x =~vα, and ~w = −ξ~vα−1. (30)
Let Z be a diagonal matrix with Zii = Dii + zi, where ~z = −λ~1 + ξ~v2α−1. Then
Zii = −(1 + λ) + ξη
{
vα−1, if i ≤ k,
uα−1, if i > k,
and D− λI = Z + ~x~wT. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that
det(D− λI) = det(Z) + ~wTadj(Z)~x
=Zk1,1Z
n−k
n,n − ξv2α−1kZk−11,1 Zn−kn,n − ξu2α−1(n− k)Zk1,1Zn−k−1n,n
=Zk−11,1 Z
n−k−1
n,n
(
Z1,1Zn,n − ξv2α−1kZn,n − ξu2α−1(n− k)Z1,1
)
.
After a lot of simplifying, using the definition of η and that kv+ (n−k)u = 1 we get that the term in brackets
is zero if and only if
(1 + λ)2 − (1 + λ)ξ(uv)α−1 = 0,
i.e. if and only if λ = −1 or λ = −1 + ξ(uv)α−1. The latter is < 0 precisely when ξ(uv)α−1 < 1.
If k > 1 then we also have an eigenvalue when Z1,1 = 0, for which λ = −1 + ξηvα−1 is negative when
ξηvα−1 < 1. Similarly if n− k > 1 then we also have an eigenvalue when Zn,n = 0 for which λ = −1 + ξηuα−1
is negative when ξηuα−1 < 1.
Since u < v we have that ξηuα−1 < 1 if ξηvα−1 < 1. Next,
η =uα−1(kv(v/u)α−1 + (n− k)u) > uα−1(kv + (n− k)u) = uα−1.
This implies that ξ(uv)α−1 < 1 if ξηvα−1 < 1. Similarly vα−1 > η so ξηuα−1 < 1 when ξ(uv)α−1 < 1.
Therefore, we have proved that the equilibrium with k = 1 is linearly stable if and only if ξ(uv)α−1 < 1 and
the equilibrium with k ≥ 2 is linearly stable if and only if ξηvα−1 < 1. Since v satisfies
v =
1
n+ 1
+
1
n+ 1
× v
α
kvα + (n− k)uα =
1
n+ 1
+
ξηvα
α
,
the condition ξηvα−1 < 1 is equivalent to v < α(α−1)(n+1) . 
Remark: The proof of Lemma 3.6 shows that if k ≥ 2 and ((v)k, (u)n−k) ∈ Sα then ξ(uv)α−1 < 1. This
observation will be useful for us later, when we investigate the stability of these equilibria.
Lemma 3.7. Assume that ((v)k, (u)n−k) ∈ Eα with v > u and ξ and η are defined as in Lemma 3.6. Then
the condition ξ(uv)α−1 < 1 is equivalent to ∂v/∂α > 0.
15
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 3.5, that is t = ln(v/u). Taking the derivative
∂/∂α of both sides of equation (26) we obtain, with t′ = dtdα ,
ett′
(n+ k(et − 1))2 =
1
n+ 1
· e
αt(t+ αt′)
(n− k + keαt)2 .
Since t > 0 the above equation gives us
ett′
(n+ k(et − 1))2 >
α
n+ 1
· e
αtt′
(n− k + keαt)2 .
Rewriting this inequality in terms of u and v (recall that u = 1/(n+ k(et − 1)) and et = v/u) we obtain
uvt′ >
α
n+ 1
· (uv)
α
(kvα + (n− k)uα)2 t
′
which is equivalent to
t′(ξ(uv)α−1 − 1) < 0.
Therefore, ξ(uv)α−1 < 1 if and only if t′ > 0, which is equivalent to ∂v/∂α > 0 since t = log(v/u) and
u = (1− kv)/(n− k). 
Proof of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The fact that (1/n)n ∈ Sα if and only if α < n+1 is part (iii) of Corollary
1.19. By Lemma 3.4 all other equilibria are of the form ((v)k, (u)n−k) for some v > u, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
If n = 2 then k = 1 ≥ n/2, and we have by Lemma 3.5 that there exists an (unique) equilibrium of the
form ((v)k, (u)n−k) with v > u if and only if α > n + 1, and that v(α) is increasing to 2/3. This proves
Theorem 3.2.
For n > 2, if k = 1 and α ∈ (α˜(1, n), n + 1) we have by Lemma 3.5 that there exist two equilibria of the
form (v, (u)n−1), one of which has ∂v/∂α < 0 and the other ∂v/∂α > 0. Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 tell us that
linear stability is equivalent to ∂v/∂α > 0, so this shows that only one of these two equilibria is linearly stable.
When α > n + 1 we have a unique equilibrium of the form (v, (u)n−1), and since ∂v/∂α > 0 it is linearly
stable.
Next, let us consider the equilibria corresponding to k > 1. First, assume that k ≥ n/2 or k < n/2 and
α > n+ 1. Then we have only one such equilibrium, which exists for α > n+ 1. However, if α > n+ 1 then
α/((α − 1)(n + 1)) < 1/n, and Lemma 3.6 tells us that such an equilibrium can not be linearly stable (since
v > u implies v > 1/n).
Finally, let us consider the case k < n/2 and α ∈ (α(k, n), n + 1). In this case we have two equilibria,
corresponding to two solutions of equation αt = fk,n(t) (see Figure 1). Let us denote these equilibria
~v(1) = ~v(1)(α) = ((v(1))k, (u
(1))n−k)
and similarly for ~v(2) = ~v(2)(α). We assume that v(1) < v(2). From the proof of Lemma 3.5 we know that v(1)
is a decreasing function of α while v(2) is an increasing function of α.
From the remark on page 15 and Lemma 3.7, ~v(1) can not be linearly stable since v(1)(α) is decreasing in
α.
Let us consider the equilibrium ~v(2). If this equilibrium is stable, then from Lemma 3.6, we find that
v(2) < α/((α−1)(n+1)). Since v(1) < v(2), we see that v(1) also satisfies the condition v(1) < α/((α−1)(n+1)),
therefore ~v(1) must be a stable equilibrium due to Lemma 3.6. Thus we have arrived at a contradiction (since
we know that ~v(1) can not be linearly stable), and we conclude that ~v(2) is not linearly stable. 
3.3 Triangle graph
Consider a WARM triangle graph, under Condition (α). Equations (3) give us the following
v1 =
1
3
vα1
vα1 + v
α
2
+
1
3
vα1
vα1 + v
α
3
,
v2 =
1
3
vα2
vα2 + v
α
3
+
1
3
vα2
vα1 + v
α
2
, (31)
v3 =
1
3
vα3
vα1 + v
α
3
+
1
3
vα3
vα2 + v
α
3
.
From now on we will list (v1, v2, v3) in the decreasing order: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3.
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Theorem 3.8 (Equilibira and stability for WARM triangle graph). The only equilibria for the WARM triangle
graph are given by
(i) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), for all α > 1;
(ii) (1/2, 1/2, 0), for all α > 1;
(iii) (v, u, 0) for α > 3, where v > u and v(α) increases from v(3+) = 1/2 to v(+∞) = 2/3 (here (v, u) is an
equilibrium for the line/star graph with two edges, see Theorem 3.2);
(iv) (v, v, u), for α ∈ (1, 4/3], where v > u and v(α) decreases from v(1+) = 1/2 to v(4/3−) = 1/3.
(v) (v, u, u), for α ≥ 4/3, where v > u and v(α) increases from v(4/3+) = 1/3 to v(+∞) = 2/3;
Their stability properties are listed below:
Equilibrium (i) is linearly stable if and only if α < 4/3,
Equilibrium (ii) is linearly stable if and only if α < 3,
Equilibrium (iii) is linearly stable for all α > 3,
Equilibria (iv) and (v) are not linearly stable,
The equilibria are critical if and only if equality holds in the above.
The proof will be completed by a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 3.9. There exist equilibria described in items (iv) and (v) in Theorem 3.8.
Proof. Let us consider an equilibrium (v, u, u) with v > u. Let us denote v/u = et, note that t > 0. From the
condition v + 2u = 1 we find that u = (2 + et)−1. Then equation (2) in (31) gives us
1
2 + et
=
1
6
+
1
3
· 1
1 + eαt
, (32)
which can be rewritten in the form
eαt =
3et
4− et ,
which is equivalent to
h(t) := ln
(
3
4− et
)
= (α− 1)t. (33)
One can check that the function h(t) is convex on t ∈ (0, log(4)) and it satisfies h(0) = 0 and h′(0) = 1/3,
therefore (33) has a positive solution t = t(α) if and only if α > 4/3 (and this solution is necessarily unique).
The graph of the function t 7→ h(t) is given in Figure 3. It is clear that dt/dα > 0 (see Figure 3), which implies
that v(α) is an increasing function. Finally, t(4/3) = 0 and t(+∞) = ln(4), which gives us v(4/3+) = 1/3 and
v(+∞) = 2/3. This completes the proof of part (v) in Theorem 3.8.
Let us now consider an equilibrium (v, v, u) with v > u. This case is equivalent to the previous one, except
that now we have u/v = et and t < 0. One can check that t also must satisfy (33), and that (33) has a negative
solution if and only if α ∈ (1, 4/3). This solution t = t(α) is unique, and it satisfies dtdα > 0, which translates
into the property that v(α) = 1/(2 + et) is a decreasing function. Since t(4/3) = 0 and t(1) = −∞ we see that
v(1+) = 1/2 and v(4/3−) = 1/3. 
Lemma 3.10. For α ∈ (1, 4/3), there are no equilibria other than (i)-(v) of Theorem 3.8.
Proof. Assume that (v, u, 0) is an equilibrium. Then (v, u) is an equilibrium for the line graph with two edges,
and Theorem 3.2 shows that for α ∈ (1, 3] the only such equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2), and for α > 3 there are two
such equilibria, (1/2, 1/2, 0) and (v, 1 − v, 0). This shows that there do not exist any other equilibria of the
form (v, 1 − v, 0). Let us consider (v1, v2, v3), where v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 > 0. We will show that if α ∈ (1, 4/3) and
(v1, v2, v3) is an equilibrium, then necessarily v1 = v2. Assume v1 > v2. We introduce the new variables s > 0
and a ≥ 1 (
v2
v1
)α
= e−s,
(
v2
v3
)α
= a.
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Figure 3: Finding equilibriums of the form (v, u, u) and (v, v, u). The black curve is the graph of
the function y = h(t) = ln(3/(4− exp(t))), the straight lines correspond to graphs of the functions
y = (α− 1)t for α = 2 (blue) and α = 7/6 (red).
Dividing the second equation in (31) by the first one we get
v2
v1
=
1
1+
(
v3
v2
)α + 1
1+
(
v1
v2
)α
1
1+
(
v2
v1
)α + 1
1+
(
v3
v1
)α
In our new notation, this is equivalent to
e−
s
α =
1
1+a−1 +
1
1+es
1
1+e−s +
1
1+a−1e−s
.
We rewrite the above equation as
e(1−
1
α
)s =
a
1+a +
1
1+es
1
1+es +
a
1+aes
,
and this is equivalent to(
1− 1
α
)
s = ln(1 + 2a+ aes) + ln(1 + aes)− ln(1 + a+ 2aes)− ln(1 + a) =: fa(s). (34)
We will show that for all a ≥ 1 and for all β := (1 − 1/α) ∈ [0, 1/4], the equation fa(s) = βs, s ≥ 0 has a
unique solution s = 0, which implies that v1 = v2. We calculate
f ′a(s) = 1−
1 + 2a
1 + 2a+ aes
− 1
1 + aes
+
1 + a
1 + a+ 2aes
,
which shows that
4f ′a(s)− 1 =
6a3e3s + 3a2(a+ 1)e2s + (6a3 − 8a2 − 4a)es − 2a2 − 3a− 1
(1 + 2a+ aes)(1 + aes)(1 + a+ 2aes)
.
Note that, for all s > 0,
6a3e3s + (3a3 − 8a2 − 4a)es > 6a3es + (6a3 − 8a2 − 4a)es = 4aes(3a2 − 2a− 1) ≥ 0, for all a ≥ 1,
and
3a2(a+ 1)e2s − 2a2 − 3a− 1 > 3a3 + a2 − 3a− 1 = (3a+ 1)(a2 − 1) ≥ 0, for all a ≥ 1.
Therefore we have proved that f ′a(s) > 1/4 for all a ≥ 1 and all s > 0. As a result, for all β ∈ (0, 1/4) it is true
that the function s 7→ fa(s)−βs is strictly increasing, and since fa(0) = 0 it shows that the only non-negative
solution to fa(s) = βs is s = 0. 
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Lemma 3.11. For α ≥ 4/3 there are no equilibria other than (i)-(v) of Theorem 3.8.
Proof. We assume that α ≥ 4/3 and v2 > v3 > 0, our goal is to show that this leads to a contradiction. We
start by rewriting the second and the third equations in (31) as follows
3
vα−12
=
a+ 2b+ c
(a+ b)(b+ c)
,
3
vα−13
=
a+ b+ 2c
(a+ c)(b+ c)
,
where we have denoted a = vα1 , b = v
α
2 and c = v
α
3 . Dividing the second equation by the first one we obtain(
v2
v3
)α−1
=
(a+ b+ 2c)(a+ b)
(a+ 2b+ c)(a+ c)
.
Some simple algebra shows that the above equation is equivalent to(
v2
v3
)α−1
− 1 = b
2 − c2
(a+ 2b+ c)(a+ c)
.
Since b2 − c2 = (b− c)(b+ c) = (b/c− 1)(b+ c)c, the previous equation can be rewritten as
v2
v3
×
(
v2
v3
)α−1
− 1(
v2
v3
)α
− 1
=
v2
v3
× (b+ c)c
(a+ 2b+ c)(a+ c)
. (35)
Let us denote the expression in the left-hand side {resp. in the right-hand side} as L {resp. R}. Our first goal
is to prove that L > 1/4. Let us denote w = v2/v3, note that w > 1. Then
L := w
wα−1 − 1
wα − 1 = 1−
w − 1
wα − 1 . (36)
It is easy to check that for all α > 1 the function z 7→ (zα − 1)/(z − 1) is strictly increasing for z ∈ (1,∞),
therefore we have
wα − 1
w − 1 > limz→1+
zα − 1
z − 1 = α.
This implies (w − 1)/(wα − 1) < 1/α and
L = 1− w − 1
wα − 1 > 1−
1
α
≥ 1/4. (37)
Our second goal is to prove that R ≤ 1/4. Let us denote x = v2/v1 and y = v3/v2, so that v2 = xv1 and
v3 = xyv1. Note that the inequality v1 ≥ v2 > v3 > 0 implies 0 < x ≤ 1 and 0 < y < 1. We rewrite the
right-hand side in (35) as
R :=
v2
v3
× (b+ c)c
(a+ 2b+ c)(a+ c)
=
v2(v
α
2 + v
α
3 )v
α−1
3
(vα1 + 2v
α
2 + v
α
3 )(v
α
1 + v
α
3 )
(38)
=
x2αyα−1(1 + yα)
(1 + xα(2 + yα))(1 + xαyα)
=: f(x, y).
First we check that for all q > 0 the function z 7→ z2/((1 + z(2 + q))(1 + zq)) is increasing for z > 0, thus
sup
0<z≤1
z2
(1 + z(2 + q))(1 + zq)
=
z2
(1 + z(2 + q))(1 + zq)
∣∣∣
z=1
=
1
(3 + q)(1 + q)
.
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Therefore from the above identity and (38) we obtain
R ≤ sup
0<t<1
[
sup
0<s≤1
f(s, t)
]
= sup
0<t<1
tα−1(1 + tα)
[
sup
0<s≤1
s2α
(1 + sα(2 + tα))(1 + sαtα)
]
= sup
0<t<1
tα−1
3 + tα
. (39)
Consider the function g(t) := tα−1/(3 + tα). We compute
dg(t)
dt
=
tα−2(3(α− 1)− tα)
(3 + tα)2
.
Since 3(α− 1) ≥ 1 for α ≥ 4/3, we see that dg(t)/dt > 0 for 0 < t < 1, thus g(t) is increasing for t ∈ (0, 1) and
sup
0<s≤1
0<t<1
f(s, t) = sup
0<t<1
tα−1
3 + tα
=
tα−1
3 + tα
∣∣∣
t=1
=
1
4
.
The above equation combined with (35), (37) and (39) imply 1/4 < L = R ≤ 1/4. This shows that our initial
assumption v2 > v3 > 0 can not be true, therefore v3 = 0 or v2 = v3. 
Lemma 3.12. Let us define
η :=
α(uv)α
3(uα + vα)2
.
An equilibrium of the form (v, u, u) or (u, u, v) for v > u is linearly stable if and only if both η < uv and
η < u− α6 .
Proof. Assume that (v1, v2, v3) = (v, u, u) and v 6= u. The Jacobian matrix is of the form
D =
−1 + 2ηv − ηu − ηu−ηv −1 + α12u + ηu − α12u−ηv − α12u −1 + α12u + ηu
 . (40)
One can check that
det(D− λI) = −(λ+ 1)
(
λ+ 1− η
uv
(v + 2u)
)(
λ+ 1− α+ 6η
6u
)
.
Since v + 2u = 1 we see that the eigenvalues are
λ1 = −1, λ2 = −1 + η
uv
, λ3 = −1 + α+ 6η
6u
.

Lemma 3.13. The equilibrium of Theorem 3.8(iv) is not linearly stable.
Proof. Assume that (v, u, u) is an equilibrium, such that v > u and α > 4/3. In order to show that (v, u, u)
is not a linearly stable equilibrium it is enough to prove that that η > u − α/6 (see Lemma 3.12). Define
r = v/u. The condition η > u− α/6 is equivalent to
1
2
+
rα
(1 + rα)2
>
3
α(2 + r)
.
This inequality is obvious if α > 2, so we only need to consider α ∈ (4/3, 2]. Let us introduce the new variable
z = r
α
2 − 1, so that r = (1 + z) 2α . With this notation, we need to prove that for all α ∈ (4/3, 2] and all z > 0
1
2
+
(1 + z)2
(1 + (1 + z)2)2
>
3
α(2 + (1 + z)
2
α )
.
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For all α ∈ (4/3, 2] and all z > 0 we have (1 + z) 2α ≥ 1 + z, therefore
3
α(2 + (1 + z)
2
α )
≤ 3
α(3 + z)
<
9
4(3 + z)
.
So it is enough to show that for all z > 0
1
2
+
(1 + z)2
(1 + (1 + z)2)2
>
9
4(3 + z)
.
Multiplying both sides by (1 + (1 + z)2)2(3 + z) and simplifying the resulting expressions, we obtain that the
above inequality is equivalent to
2z5 + 5z4 + 8z3 + 12z2 + 12z > 0 for all z > 0,
which is obviously true. 
Lemma 3.14. The equilibrium of Theorem 3.8(v) is not linearly stable.
Proof. We will show that the first condition of Lemma 3.12 is not satisfied, that is η > uv for all α > 4/3.
Assume that (v, v, u) is an equilibrium. Consider the same parameterization as in the proof of Lemma 3.9:
u/v = et, v = (2+et)−1. Note that t < 0 and from the proof of Lemma 3.9 we know that dtdα > 0. We consider
t as a function of α. Equation (32) gives us
d
dα
[
1
2 + et
]
=
d
dα
[
1
6
+
1
3
· 1
1 + eαt
]
,
which is equivalent to
ett′
(2 + et)2
=
1
3
· e
αt(t+ αt′)
(1 + eαt)2
,
where t′ := dtdα . Since t < 0 and t
′ > 0,
et
(2 + et)2
<
1
3
· e
αtα
(1 + eαt)2
.
Since et = u/v and (2 + et)−1 = v, the above inequality gives us
uv <
α(uv)α
3(uα + vα)2
.
Applying Lemma 3.12, we conclude that (v, v, u) is not a linearly stable equilibrium. 
3.4 Whisker graph
Since we already understand the star-graph setting, let us in this section restrict our attention to whisker
graphs that are not star graphs.
For the (r, s)-whisker graph (with r + 1 + s = n), ~v ∈ Eα if and only if ~v satisfies (for all i = 1, . . . , n)
0 = F (~v)i = −vi + 1
n+ 1

1 +
vαi
δr
, i ≤ r,
vαr+1
[
1
δr
+ 1δs
]
, i = r + 1,
1 +
vαi
δs
, r + 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
(41)
where δr =
∑r+1
i=1 v
α
i and δs =
∑n
i=r+1 v
α
i . Fixing δr and repeating the proof of Lemma 3.4 with f given
by (24), we have that for any equilibrium ~v on a whisker graph, {v1, . . . , vr} has at most 2 distinct elements
(only one element when δr /∈ (α−1)(n+1)α (1, 2α)). Similarly {vr+2, . . . , vn} has at most 2 distinct elements (only
one element when δs /∈ (α−1)(n+1)α (1, 2α)). From this we obtain the following lemma:
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Lemma 3.15. For all α > 1, all equilibria for a whisker graph are of the form
((v)kr , (u)r−kr , vr+1, (v
′)ks , (u
′)s−ks). (42)
Note that vr+1 ≥ 0 and all other entries are bounded above and below by 2/(n + 1) and 1/(n + 1),
respectively. For such ~v, we have that δr = krv
α + (r − kr)uα + vαr+1 and similarly δs = ks(v′)α + (s −
ks)(u
′)α + vαr+1.
Letting ξr =
α
(n+1)δ2r
and ξs =
α
(n+1)δ2s
we have that
Di,i =− 1 + α
n+ 1

vα−1i
[
δr−vαi
δ2r
]
, i ≤ r,
vα−1r+1
[
(δr−vαr+1)
δ2r
+
(δs−vαr+1)
δ2s
]
, i = r + 1,
vα−1i
[
δs−vαi
δ2s
]
, r + 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
(43)
=− 1 +

ξrv
α−1(δr − vα), i ≤ kr,
ξru
α−1(δr − uα), kr + 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
ξrv
α−1
r+1 (δr − vαr+1) + ξsvα−1r+1 (δs − vαr+1), i = r + 1
ξs(v
′)α−1(δs − (v′)α), r + 2 ≤ i ≤ r + 2 + ks,
ξs(u
′)α−1(δs − (u′)α), r + 2 + ks ≤ i ≤ n.
Moreover Di,` = 0 if i ≤ r and ` ≥ r + 2 (or vice versa) and otherwise
Di,` = −vαi vα−1`
{
ξr, i, ` ≤ r + 1, i 6= `,
ξs, i, ` ≥ r + 1, i 6= `.
Now M ≡ D− λI is of the form
M =
A ~g 0~hT a ~tT
0 ~z B
 ,
where A ∈ Rr×r has the same form as the matrix D− λI in the case of the star-graph on r edges,
~gT = − αv
α−1
r+1
(n+ 1)δ2r
(vα, . . . , vα, uα, . . . , uα) ∈ Rr
~hT = − αv
α
r+1
(n+ 1)δ2r
(vα−1, . . . , vα−1, uα−1, . . . , uα−1) ∈ Rr
and a = Dr+1,r+1 − λ etc. We have that
~g =− ξrvα−1r+1 ~xr, ~h = vαr+1 ~wr,
where ~xr and ~wr are defined as in (30) (but with ξr instead of ξ), i.e.,
~xTr =(v
α, . . . , vα, uα, . . . , uα), and (44)
~wTr =− ξr(vα−1, . . . , vα−1, uα−1, . . . , uα−1). (45)
Similarly,
~z =− ξsvα−1r+1 ~x′s, ~t = vαr+1 ~w′s.
Lemma 3.16. The determinant of M is given by
det(M) =a det(A) det(B)−
(
det(B)~hTadj(A)~g + det(A)~tTadj(B)~z
)
. (46)
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Proof. Firstly note that det(M) = det(H), where
H =
A 0 ~g0 B ~z
~hT ~tT a
 .
Let R =
(
A 0
0 B
)
. Then using the block matrix form of H,
det(H) =(a+ 1) det(R)− det
(
R +
(
~g
~z
)
(~hT,~tT)
)
.
Now by definition of adj we have that Radj(R) = det(R)I, from which it follows easily that for R of the
form
(
A 0
0 B
)
adj(R) =
(
det(B)adj(A) 0
0 det(A)adj(B)
)
Combining this with Lemma 2.1, we arrive at
det(H) =(a+ 1) det(R)−
(
det(R) + (~hT,~tT)adj(R)
(
~g
~z
))
=a det(R)−
(
det(B)~hTadj(A)~g + det(A)~tTadj(B)~z
)
.
But det(R) = det(A) det(B), yielding (46). 
Now we know that A and B can be written in the form A = Z + ~xr ~w
T
r and B = Z
′ + ~x′s(~w
′
s)
T and where
Z and Z′ are diagonal matrices with
Zii =− (1 + λ) + δrξr
{
vα−1, i ≤ kr,
uα−1, kr < i ≤ r,
Z ′ii =− (1 + λ) + δsξs
{
(v′)α−1, i ≤ ks,
(u′)α−1, ks < i ≤ n− r − 1,
for which adj(Z) is easy to express. Indeed,
det(Z) =(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)kr (−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1)r−kr ,
~wTr adj(Z)~ur =− ξr
(
kr∑
i=1
v2α−1
[
(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)kr−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1)r−kr
]
+
r∑
i=kr+1
u2α−1
[
(−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1)kr (−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−kr−1
])
,
and if both kr ≥ 1 and r − kr ≥ 1 this becomes
~wTr adj(Z)~ur =− ξr(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)kr−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1)r−kr−1(
krv
2α−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1) + (r − kr)u2α−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξruα−1)
)
.
Similarly
det(Z′) =(−(1 + λ) + δsξsvα−1)ks(−(1 + λ) + δsξs(u′)α−1)s−ks ,
~wTs adj(Z
′)~us =− ξs
(
ks∑
i=1
(v′)2α−1
[
(−(1 + λ) + δsξs(v′)α−1)ks−1(−(1 + λ) + δsξs(u′)α−1)s−ks
]
+
s∑
i=ks+1
(u′)α−1
[
(−(1 + λ) + δsξs(u′)α−1)ks(−(1 + λ) + δsξs(v′)α−1)s−ks−1
])
.
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The question is whether we can handle the term of the form ~hTadj(A)~g. However, again by Lemma 2.1,
~hTadj(A)~g = det(A + ~g~hT)− det(A),
and we know what to do with det(A) as above. On the other hand, since A = Z + ~ur ~wr and ~g = −ξrvα−1r+1 ~ur
and ~h = vαr+1 ~wr,
A + ~g~hT = Z + ~ur ~w
T
r − ξrv2α−1r+1 ~ur ~wTr = Z + (1− ξrv2α−1r+1 )~ur ~wTr .
Thus we can express the determinant of A + ~g~hT as
det(A + ~g~hT) = det(Z) + (1− ξrv2α−1r+1 )~wTr adj(Z)~ur
= det(A)− ξrv2α−1r+1 ~wTr adj(Z)~ur,
since det(A) = det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur. Since we can do the same with the B terms we can write an expression
for the determinant in terms of all these quantities.
Recall from (43) that
a =− (1 + λ) + αv
α−1
r+1
n+ 1
[
(δr − vαr+1)
δ2r
+
(δs − vαr+1)
δ2s
]
=− (1 + λ) + vα−1r+1
(
ξr(δr − vαr+1) + ξs(δs − vαr+1)
)
,
where δr − vαr+1 =
∑r
i=1 v
α
i and δs − vαr+1 =
∑n
i=r+2 v
α
i . From (46) and the above we have established the
following lemma:
Lemma 3.17. The determinant of M satisfies
det(M) =a
[
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
] [
det(Z′) + ~wTs adj(Z
′)~us
]
(47)
+
[
det(Z′) + ~wTs adj(Z
′)~us
] [
ξrv
2α−1
r+1 ~w
T
r adj(Z)~ur
]
(48)
+
[
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
] [
ξsv
2α−1
r+1 ~w
T
s adj(Z
′)~us
]
. (49)
3.4.1 Special cases
If vr+1 = 0 then a = −(1 +λ), the two terms (48) and (49) vanish and we recover the fact (see Theorem 1.22)
that the case vr+1 = 0 is linearly stable if and only if each of the remaining star graphs is linearly stable.
Let us now examine the completely symmetric case r = s = kr = ks, v = v
′.
Lemma 3.18. For the symmetric whisker graph with r = s = kr = ks, ~v = ((v)r, vr+1, (v)r) is a linearly
stable equilibrium if and only if
ξrv
α−1
r+1 v
α−1 < 1, and in the case r > 1 also δrξrvα−1 < 1.
Proof. We have that Z = Z′ etc., and thus
det(M) =a
[
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
]2
+ 2
[
ξrv
2α−1
r+1 ~w
T
r adj(Z)~ur
] [
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
]
=
[
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
] (
a
[
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur
]
+ 2
[
ξrv
2α−1
r+1 ~w
T
r adj(Z)~ur
])
.
Here det(Z) = (−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r and
det(Z) + ~wTr adj(Z)~ur =(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r − rξrv2α−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1
=(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1
[
(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)− rξrv2α−1
]
=(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1
[−(1 + λ) + ξrvα−1vαr+1] ,
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so
λ = δrξrv
α−1 − 1, and λ = ξrvα−1vαr+1 − 1
are eigenvalues, with the first of multiplicity r − 1 (vanishing when r = 1).
Next
a =− (1 + λ) + vα−1r+1
(
ξr(δr − vαr+1) + ξs(δs − vαr+1)
)
=− (1 + λ) + 2rvα−1r+1 ξrvα,
so
det(M) =
(− (1 + λ) + 2rvα−1r+1 ξrvα)(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1 [−(1 + λ) + ξrvα−1vαr+1]
− 2rξrv2α−1(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1ξrv2α−1r+1
=(−(1 + λ) + δrξrvα−1)r−1
(
1 + λ
) [
(1 + λ)− ξrvα−1r+1 vα−1
]
,
where we have used 2rv + vr+1 = 1. The corresponding eigenvalues are
λ = δrξrv
α−1 − 1, λ = −1, and λ = ξrvα−1r+1 vα−1 − 1,
with the former not being present when r = 1. 
We are now ready to state our main result of this section:
Theorem 3.19. On the symmetric whisker graph, with r ≥ 1 there exists α(r) > 1 such that for any α > α(r)
there exist two equilibria of the form ((v)r, u, (v)r), both with v < u, exactly one of which is linearly stable.
For the linearly stable equilibrium the function u(α) increases to u(+∞) = (r + 1)−1. For α < α(r) there do
not exist equilibria of the form ((v)r, u, (v)r) with u > 0
Proof. To establish the existence of such equilibria we need to show that the equation
v =
1
2(r + 1)
+
1
2(r + 1)
vα
uα + rvα
, (50)
or, equivalently,
u =
1
r + 1
uα
uα + rvα
, (51)
has a solution u > 0, v > 0, satisfying u+ 2rv = 1. We define u/v = et, then v = 1/(2r+ et) and we find from
(50) that
1
2r + et
=
1
2(r + 1)
+
1
2(r + 1)
· 1
1 + eαt
. (52)
Solving this equation for eαt we obtain
eαt =
(r + 1)et
2− et (53)
which is equivalent to
(α− 1)t = ln
(
r + 1
2− et
)
. (54)
The function hr(t) := ln((r + 1)/(2 − et)) is convex, increasing and strictly positive on t ∈ (−∞, ln(2)). The
graph of this function is shown in Figure 4. Since the function is convex, increasing and hr(0) > 0 it is clear
that there exists α(r) such that the equation hr(t) = (α − 1)t will have two solutions for α > α(r) and no
solutions for α < α(r).
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Figure 4: The graph of functions y = hr(t) (black), y = (α(r) − 1)t (red) and y = (α − 1)t for
α > α(r) (blue). The point (t(r), hr(t(r))) is marked by a red circle.
Figure 5: The graph of the function α 7→ g(α) defined in (55).
Let us define for α > 1
g(α) := (α− 1) ln(2(α− 1))− α ln(α). (55)
One can check that g′′(α) > 0, and that g′(1+) = −∞ and g(+∞) = +∞. The graph of the function α 7→ g(α)
is shown in Figure 5. For r ≥ 1 we define α∗(r) to be the unique positive solution to the equation
g(α) = ln
(
1 + r
2
)
, or equivalently
[
2
(
1− 1
α
)]α−1
=
α
2
(r + 1). (56)
We can see α(1) (the solution to g(α) = 0) marked by a red circle on Figure 5.
Let us show that α(r) satisfies equation (56) (i.e. that α(r) = α∗(r). From the graph in Figure 4 it is clear
that α(r) is characterized by the following system of two equations
hr(t) = (α− 1)t, h′r(t) = α− 1.
This system expresses the fact that the graph of the straight line y = (α − 1)t must be a tangent line to the
curve y = hr(t) at the point of their intersection t = t(r). From the equation h
′
r(t) = α− 1 we find that
et = 2
(
1− 1
α
)
(57)
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and substituting this result into the first equation hr(t) = (α − 1)t (or into the equivalent equation (53)) we
obtain (56).
Thus we have now proved that: (i) For α < α(r) there do not exist equilibria of the form ((v)r, u, (v)r); (ii)
For all α > α(r) the equation (54) has two solutions, 0 < t1(α) < t2(α) < ln(2), such that t1(α) is decreasing
in α and t2(α) is increasing in α. These two solutions give us two equilibria of the form ((v)r, u, (v)r) (recall
that u = 1/(2r + et)).
Next, let us investigate stability of these equilibria. According to Lemma 3.18, the equilibrium is linearly
stable if and only if
α(uv)α−1
2(r + 1)(uα + rvα)2
< 1, (58)
and in the case r = 1,
αvα−1
2(r + 1)(uα + rvα)
< 1. (59)
Applying the same ideas as in the proof of Lemmas 3.7 and 3.14 (taking the derivative ∂/∂α of equation
(54)) we check that the inequality (58) is equivalent to ∂t∂α > 0. One of the two equlibriums that we have
found (the one corresponding to the solution t1(α)) is decreasing in α, therefore it can not possibly be a stable
equilibrium. At the same time the second solution t2(α) is increasing in α, therefore the condition (58) is
satisfied. Let us look at the remaining condition (59). Using (51), we see that this is equivalent to(u
v
)α−1
= e(α−1)t2 >
α
2
. (60)
Recall that we have denoted the unique solution to the equation hr(t) = (α(r) − 1)t by t(r) (see Figure 4).
Note that α > α(r) and t2 > t(r). Inequality (60) is satisfied when α = α(r) and t2 = t(r), since from formulas
(56) and (57) it follows that
e(α(r)−1)t(r) =
[
2
(
1− 1
α(r)
)]α(r)−1
=
α(r)
2
(r + 1) >
α(r)
2
.
If we increase α (while keeping t2 = t(r) constant), then the inequality is still true, as the function on the
left-hand side increases faster than the function on the right-hand side. Increasing t2 will only increase the
left-hand side, while keeping the right-hand side constant, and the required inequality is still true. Thus we
have proved that the second equilibrium (the one with v/u = et2(α)) is linearly stable. 
3.5 Complete graph
Theorem 3.20. Consider a complete graph on nv vertices and n := nv(nv − 1)/2 edges. For nv = 3, the
equilibrium ~1/n is linearly stable if α < 4/3 (critical if equality holds), and it is linearly unstable if α > 4/3.
For nv ≥ 4, the equilibrium ~1/n is linearly unstable.
Proof. The case of nv = 3 (triangle graph) was considered in full detail in Theorem 3.8. Let us assume that
nv ≥ 4. Let Knv be the complete graph on nv vertices. We recall that the line-graph L = L(Knv ) is defined
by considering edges of Knv as vertices of L, and the vertices of L are adjacent if and only if the corresponding
edges of Knv are both incident to some vertex in Knv . The equations (16) give us
Di,j(~1/n) =

−1 + α− αnv−1 , if i = j,
− α2(nv−1) , if i 6= j, and i, j are both incident to some vertex x,
0, otherwise.
(61)
Note that
D =
(
−1 + α− α 1
nv − 1
)
I− α
2(nv − 1)A, (62)
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where A is the adjacency matrix of L. According to [5, Corollary 1.4.2], the matrix A has an eigenvalue −2
of degree n− nv. This shows that the matrix D has an eigenvalue
−1 + α− α 1
nv − 1 −
α
2(nv − 1) × (−2) = −1 + α > 0
of multiplicity n− nv, and therefore ~1/n is a linearly unstable equilibrium. 
3.6 Circle graph
Lemma 3.21. The equilibrium ~v = ~1/n is linearly stable if and only if n is odd and α < cos
(
pi
2n
)−2
.
Proof. For the circle graph with n vertices and edges, we label the edges {0, . . . , n− 1} around the circle (in
the obvious way) and use addition and subtraction mod (n− 1). Then, ~v is an equilibrium if and only if
vi =
1
n
vαi
vαi + v
α
i+1
+
1
n
vαi
vαi + v
α
i−1
. (63)
Moreover,
F (~v)i = −vi + 1
n
vαi
vαi + v
α
i+1
+
1
n
vαi
vαi + v
α
i−1
has derivatives
Di,i(~v) =− 1 + αv
α−1
i
n
[
1
vαi + v
α
i+1
+
1
vαi + v
α
i−1
− v
α
i
(vαi + v
α
i+1)
2
+
vαi
(vαi + v
α
i−1)2
]
,
Di,i+1(~v) =−
αvα−1i+1
n
vαi
(vαi + v
α
i+1)
2
,
Di,i−1(~v) =−
αvα−1i−1
n
vαi
(vαi + v
α
i−1)2
,
Di,k(~v) = 0 otherwise.
For ~v = ~1/n, these reduce to
Di,i(~1/n) =− 1 + α
2
,
Di,i+1(~1/n) =Di,i−1(~1/n) = −α
4
,
Di,k(~1/n) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, D is a circulant matrix with 3 consecutive (mod (n − 1)) non-zero entries −α/4, −1 + α/2, −α/4.
Therefore its eigenvalues are of the form
λj =− 1 + α
2
− α
4
e2piij/n − α
4
e−2piij/n
=− 1 + α
2
− α
2
cos(2pij/n),
for j = 0, . . . , n− 1. All of these eigenvalues are negative if and only if for every j = 0, . . . , n− 1,
α[1− cos(2pij/n)] < 2.
When n is even, the left hand side attains its maximum of 2α at j = n/2 for which the stability criterion is
α < 1. When n is odd, the left hand side attains its maximum at j = (n+1)/2 for which the stability criterion
becomes
α <
2
1− cos(pi(1 + 1/n)) =
2
1 + cos(pi/n)
=
1
cos (pi/2n)
2 ,
where the right hand side is greater than 1. 
Note that for n = 3, this reduces to α < 2/(1 + 1/2) = 4/3, which must be the case since for n = 3 this
corresponds to the case of fixed m = 2, uniform At (with n = 3). By Theorem 1.22, for n even, the vector
~valt = 2(1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 1, 0)/n is a linearly-stable equilibrium for all α > 1.
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4 Discussion and open problems
Regarding Conjecture 1.24. We have shown that when G is the triangle graph and α > 4/3, any stable
equilibrium has some vi = 0. We believe that the same is true (for α > αG) when G is the line graph on 4
edges. Assuming that this can be verified, it is reasonable to expect that for any fixed G, and all α sufficiently
large, the only linearly-stable equilibria are those admitted by whisker-forests.
We have shown that for all α > α(r) there is a linearly-stable equilibrium (or a unique equilibrium that is
critical) on a symmetric whisker-graph. We expect that the symmetry property is not needed. If this can be
verified, it would imply that for any G, any whisker-forest admits a stable equilibrium for α sufficiently large.
There are a great many problems about WARMs that remain open, among them are the following:
(i) Is it true that all ~v ∈ Eα for a WARM line graph with 3 edges are symmetric (i.e., that v1 = v3)?
(ii) Can one prove non-convergence to linearly-unstable equilibria in our general setting?
(iii) Is it in our general setting true that A ⊂ Sα when Sα 6= ∅?
More general models. This work is inspired by modelling of the brain. We think of the signal entering,
giving rise to our generalized Po´lya urn. However, in the brain, signals are transmitted between several neurons,
suggesting a model where signals perform a random motion (with or without branching of the signal). Without
branching, this could be modelled using edge-reinforced random walks (see e.g., [8, 9, 21, 22, 16, 18] and the
references therein) on graphs, killed at certain vertices. With branching, this would give rise to a certain kind
of branching reinforced walk with killing. Such problems have attracted substantial attention oven the past
decade.
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Appendix A - Proof of Theorem 1.14
The proof of Theorem 1.14 follows the proof of [3, Theorem 1.2] very closely. We repeat this argument almost
exactly, only modifying the expression of the Lyapunov function and some related objects. We have included
this material for the sake of completeness.
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 1.14 is to interpret the evolution of the WARM as a stochastic
approximation algorithm (see [2]). We introduce several definitions and notations. We recall that N (i)t denotes
the number of balls of colour i at time t ∈ Z+, N (i)0 = 1 and n is the total number of colours. We assume
that p∅ = 0, therefore the total number of balls at time t is n + t. We denote X
(i)
t := N
(i)
t /(n + t) to be the
proportion of balls of colour i. We define C(i)t be the number of balls of colour i which is added to the urn at
time t, that is C(i)t := N
(i)
t+1 −N (i)t . We denote Ft := σ{ ~Nu : 1 ≤ u ≤ t}. Note that C(i)t ∈ {0, 1} is a Bernoulli
random variable, such that
P(C(i)t = 1 | Ft) =
∑
A : i∈A
pA
(X(i)t )
α∑
j∈A
(X(j)t )
α
, (A.1)
moreover, we have
∑n
i=1 C
(i)
t = 1 (since only one ball is added to the urn at time t). By definition, we have
N (i)t+1 = N
(i)
t + C
(i)
t , therefore
X(i)t+1 −X(i)t =
1
n+ t+ 1
(−X(i)t + C(i)t ) . (A.2)
Denoting
Fi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) := −xi +
∑
A : i∈A
pA
xαi∑
j∈A
xαj
,
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and using (A.1), we can rewrite (A.2) in the form
~Xt+1 − ~Xt = γt(F ( ~Xt) + ~ut), (A.3)
where F = (F1, F2, . . . , Fn), γt := 1/(n + t + 1) and u
(i)
t := C
(i)
t − E[C(i)t | Ft]. Formula (A.3) expresses
the WARM as a stochastic approximation algorithm. This is a classical approach to studying convergence of
generalized Polya urns, as there exists a well-developed theory for stochastic approximation algorithms (see
[2, 6, 11]). In particular, the result of Theorem 1.14, (ii) follows at once from (A.3) and [2, Proposition 7.5].
We write A @ [n] when A ⊂ [n] and pA > 0. Let us denote c := 12 min{pA : A @ [n]}. We define ∆ to be
the set of n-tuples (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn such that
1. xi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, and
2. for all A @ [n] we have
∑
i∈A xi ≥ c.
Clearly F : ∆ 7→ T∆ is Lipschitz. The following lemma is an analogue of [3, Lemma 3.4]:
Lemma A.1. ∆ is positively invariant under the ODE d~v(t)dt = F (~v(t)).
Proof. If v belongs to the boundary of ∆, then either vi = 0 for some i ∈ [n], or there exists a set A @ [n] with∑
i∈A vi = c. In the former case, since Fi(~v) = 0 if vi = 0, it is clear that v(t) will stay on the corresponding
boundary. Let us consider the latter case. Given a set A with pA > 0, we have
d
dt
∑
i∈A
vi =
∑
i∈A
(
− vi +
∑
B : i∈B
pB
vαi∑
j∈B
vαj
)
≥
∑
i∈A
(
− vi + pA v
α
i∑
j∈A
vαj
)
= −
∑
i∈A
vi + pA.
If v is on the boundary of ∆ and there exists a set A such that
∑
i∈A vi = c, then
d
dt
∑
i∈A
vi ≥ −
∑
i∈A
vi + pA = −c+ pA > 0,
which means that F points inward on the boundary of ∆. 
We recall that E = Eα denotes the set of equilibria of the WARM (the set of solutions to F (~v) = ~0).
Definition A.2 (Strict Lyapunov function). A strict Lyapunov function for a vector field F is a continuous
map L : ∆ 7→ R which is strictly monotone along any integral curve of F outside of E. In this case, we call F
gradient-like.
We define a function L : ∆ 7→ R as
L(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = −
n∑
i=1
xi +
1
α
∑
A
pA ln
(∑
j∈A
xαj
)
. (A.4)
One can check that
xi
∂L
∂xi
= −xi +
∑
A:i∈A
pA
xαi∑
j∈A
xαj
= Fi(~x) (A.5)
The following result is an analogue of [3, Lemma 4.1]:
Lemma A.3. L is a strict Lyapunov function for F .
Proof. Assume that v(t) = (v1(t), v2(t), . . . , vn(t)) is an integral curve of F , which means that
dv
dt = F (v),
then
d
dt
L(v(t)) =
n∑
i=1
∂L
∂xi
dvi
dt
=
n∑
i=1
vi
(
∂L
∂xi
)2
≥ 0.
The last expression is zero if and only if vi
(
∂L
∂xi
)2
= 0 for all i ∈ [n], which is equivalent to F (v) = 0 (or
v ∈ E).

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The proof of Theorem 1.14(i) relies on the following result (see [1], [2] and [3, Theorem 3.3]):
Theorem A.4. Let F : Rn 7→ Rn be a continuous gradient-like vector field with unique integral curves, let E
be its equilibria set, let L be a strict Lyapunov function, and let ~Xt be a solution to the recursion (A.3), where
(γt)t≥0 is a decreasing sequence and (~ut)t≥0 ⊂ Rn. Assume that
(i) ( ~Xt)t≥0 is bounded,
(ii) for each T > 0,
lim
t→+∞
(
sup
{k : 0≤τk−τn≤T}
∥∥∥ k−1∑
i=n
γi~ui
∥∥∥) = 0,
where τn =
n−1∑
i=0
γi, and
(iii) L(E) ⊂ R has empty interior.
Then the limit set of ( ~Xt)t≥0 is a connected subset of E.
Proof of Theorem 1.14(i). Again, the proof follows the proof of [3, Theorem 1.2] very closely. Note that
γt = 1/(n+ t+ 1) satisfies
lim
t→+∞ γt = 0, and
∑
t≥0
γt = +∞.
It is obvious from the definition that ( ~Xt)t≥0 is bounded, thus condition (i) of Theorem A.4 is satisfied. Let
us verify condition (ii). We define
~Mt :=
t∑
s=0
γs~us.
It is clear that ( ~Mt)t≥0 is a martingale adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0. Furthermore, since for any t ≥ 0,
t∑
s=0
E
[
‖ ~Ms+1 − ~Ms‖2|Fs
]
≤
t∑
s=0
γ2s+1 ≤
∞∑
s=0
γ2s <∞,
the sequence ( ~Mt)t≥0 converges almost surely and in L2 to a finite random vector. In particular, it is a Cauchy
sequence and therefore, the condition (ii) holds almost surely.
Now we need to verify condition (iii) in Theorem A.4. We need to distinguish between equilibria lying in
the interior of E and those lying on the boundary. For each subset S ⊂ [n], we define
∆S := {v ∈ ∆: vi = 0 iff i /∈ S}.
We see that ∆S is a face of ∆, it is also a manifold with corners, and, extending the result of Lemma A.1, it
is easy to see that ∆S is positively invariant under the ODE
d~v
dt = F (~v).
Definition A.5. ~v ∈ ∆S is an S-singularity for L if
∂L
∂vi
(~v) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Let ES ⊂ ∆S denote the set of S-singularities for L.
Lemma A.6. E = ∪S⊂[n]ES.
Proof. ~v ∈ E means that F (~v) = 0, and due to (A.5) this is equivalent to vi ∂L∂vi = 0. Therefore, ~v ∈ E implies
that for all i ∈ [n], either vi = 0 or ∂L∂vi = 0. 
In order to check condition (iii) of Theorem A.4, we need to show that L(E) = 0. For any S ⊂ [n], the
function L restricted to ∆S is a C
∞ function, thus by Sard’s theorem L(ES) has zero Lebesgue measure, which
implies that L(E) has zero Lebesgue measure, which in turn implies that L(E) has empty interior. This verifies
condition (iii) in Theorem A.4, and ends the proof of Theorem 1.14(i). 
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